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Abstract
This paper is an attempt to incorporate the human ability of recognition, especially, the ability to
recognize the society to which they belong, with the economic equilibrium theory characterized by
a description of society through individual rational behaviors. Contents may be classified into the
following three categories: (1) a rigorous set theoretical treatment of the description of individual
rationality; (2) set theoretical description of the validity in a society; and (3) rationality as an
equilibrium (fixed point) of social recognition.
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1 INTRODUCTION
This work is an attempt to incorporate the human ability to recognize or grasp the world to which
they belong with set theoretical view of the society as the totality of rational individuals given by
contemporary game and economic theories. In this paper, results are classified into three categories:
problems on individuals and rationality (Section 2), society and values in it (Section 3), and equilibrium
and social recognition (Section 4).
Section 2, “Individuals and Rationality,” is a formal treatment of set theoretic limitations in describing
society as consisting of rational individuals. It is shown that the concept of rationality, at least in the
sense of the rational acceptability of sentences in a certain formal language, cannot completely be
described as long as we require it to be both semantically (introspectively) and logically consistent. The
result is obtained as a variation of Tarski’s truth definition theorem, a closely related result to Go¨del’s
second incompleteness theorem. I am convinced that the argument could serve as a launching pad for
rigorous mathematical treatments on the problematic cognitive features of all mathematical models in
social science based on methodological individualism.
Section 3, “Society and Values,” deals with problems of describing human society as a whole from
macroscopic viewpoints. The description of society, in the sense of a collection of sentences valid for
descriptions of society in a certain formal language, cannot be semantically consistent (introspectively
complete), as long as we require it to be logically consistent. It follows that for logical consistency, we
cannot define society in an introspectively complete manner. In other words, we cannot assure rightness
on the validity for descriptions of society, (not to speak of optimality, efficiency, etc.), except for believing
it.1 The results may also be considered a mathematical critique of empiricism (logical positivism) as a
methodology of social science.2
We may relate the results in Sections 2 and 3 to our ordinary way of “justification” (set theoretically,
an internal condition — consistency in a view of the world as an extensional condition — for true
rationality, if it exists,) and “refutability” (that forms an external condition — inconsistency on a view
of the world for an intensional condition — for rationality). Section 4 incorporates these two features
into a social equilibrium argument, so that ‘rationality,’ as a non-refutable justification, is assured to
exist as a fixed point (equilibrium) of recognition of the world for each member of society.
The contents in Sections 2 (individual rationality) and 3, (social value) are based on my earlier
papers written in 2002 (Urai (2002a), Urai (2002b), and Urai (2002c)), including several important
mathematical corrections on theorems as well as in proofs. Section 4 was originally prepared as a separate
article on equilibrium. Hence, it would also be possible for readers to read each section independently.
2 INDIVIDUAL AND RATIONALITY
In this section, we see that there is no set theoretical formal description of human society that
incorporates our quite natural and important kind of inference (recognition) ability. There are many
1The problem is based on the difficulty of defining “judgements for facts” since it should also determine our value
judgements concerning what our “facts” are. According to H. Putnam, targets of such value judgements are called
epistemic values (Putnam, 2002; p. 30) whose existence expounds the collapse of the classical fact/value dichotomy. We
should note that mathematical models in social science always implicitly or explicitly presuppose one such value.
2W.V.O. Quine in his famous essay, “Two dogmas of empiricism,” in 1951 (reprinted in Quine (1953)) treated the
problem as the difficulty of defining analyticity.
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causes for the impossibility to obtain a ‘complete’ social model in the sense that every feature of the world
is completely described. Indeed, standard economic theory admits many types of ‘externality.’ There
are many unknown structures in the real world, especially in technologies, information, preferences, and
expectations, etc. It seems, however, that such problems have been recognized by theorists as merely
the gap between an idealized economic model and reality. What I am concerned with here is not the
gap between them but the impossibility of the notion of an idealized model itself.
If the purpose of economics is to describe human society as theoretical and well-founded mechanisms
of ‘rational’ individuals, an economic model should formalize a system of rules that enables each agent’s
behavior to be called ‘rational.’ In order to formalize such economic ‘rationality,’ however, we should
premise a restricted view on individual prospects or thoughts about the whole world. If we don’t, as we
shall see in the following, the view of the world necessarily becomes inconsistent (hence, every action is
rational for him). On the other hand, with such a restricted view of the world, agents are not allowed
to ask whether the world is exactly as they are thinking (in their view of the model). In other words, a
consistent view (description) of the world must be incomplete in the sense that every agent should be
convinced in the rightness of the view itself without any proofs.
The result in this section is related to Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem. Indeed, the main
theorem in this section may be considered a generalized version of Tarski’s truth definition theorem,
which is another important result of Go¨del’s lemma for the incompleteness theorem.3 Note, however,
that there is an important difference between the foundation of mathematics (Go¨del’s theorem) and the
foundation of our view on society including ourselves. The former is a problem on what mathematics
can do to formalize rationality, and the latter is an argument for formalizing rationality itself. We
may change and reconstruct mathematics through our convictions and beliefs. To formalize ourselves,
however, any restricted formalization may fail to characterize our total recognition ability; there isn’t
any simple way or regular routine to formalize our general intelligence.
In this section, rationality is treated as an attitude to accept certain kinds of formal assertions written
in formal language.4 The syntax for such a language and semantics (especially for the meanings of
rationality) are given by a theory of sets B = (LB , RB , TB) called an underlying theory of sets.
5 We
assume that each person i using his/her formal language has a theory Li = (Li, Ri, Ti) that is at least
as strong as the underlying theory of sets B.6 Thus, we are modeling a situation where person i can
treat his/her assertion θ in the language of i (theory Li) as a set theoretic object pθq through basic
underlying theory B. The problem we treat in this section is whether we may construct a formula Pi(x)
of person i in one free variable x such that Pi(pθq) means that θ is a rationally acceptable assertion of i.
Of course the answer depends on properties requested for the meanings of ‘rational acceptability.’ What
we are concerned with here are logical consistency ( Pi(pθq) and Pi(p¬θq) never occur simultaneously)
and introspective completeness ( Pi(pθq) means Pi(pPi(pθq)q) ). The main theorem in this section
shows that there is no Pi satisfying both of these two critical properties (Theorem 2.3). Theorems in
3Mathematical concepts in this section may be found in the standard literature in mathematical logic and/or theory
of sets, e.g., see Kunen (1980), Jech (2003), Fraenkel et al. (1973).
4Throughout this section, I use linguistic definitions and approaches that may be common in classical arguments in
analytical philosophy. From the standpoint of our notions of rationality and truth, however, I am influenced by the recent
works of H. Putnam (after Putnam (1983)) and works in cognitive science such as Lakoff (1987), etc.
5A precise definition will be given in Section 2.
6Of course there must be an appropriate translation between his/her formal language and the language for B.
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this section show:
(1) The description of the world under notion Pi cannot be complete as long as we require Pi to
be consistent. (Theorem 2.3.)
(2) Especially, we cannot introspectively recognize the consistency and the completeness (of our
world view) itself. (Theorem 2.1, Theorem 2.2.)
(3) We cannot define (completely describe) rationality as long as we require it to be consistent.
(Theorem 2.3.)
Therefore, all rational economic agents in a standard economic model should believe in their rational
choices without knowing whether being rational is (truly) rational. All players in non-cooperative game
theory should believe in their own rational behavior as well as their opponents’ without without knowing
what rationality exactly means. This seems to be a failure in all mathematical models in social science
based on the methodological individualism. Indeed, the concept of ‘rational individual’ (consistency)
always prevents us from providing a satisfactory answer to the question: ‘What exactly is society?’
(introspection) (see, Theorem 2.2 (b) and (d)). Therefore, every such agent naturally fails to possess
self confidence in his/her rationality. Of course this is not saying that all attempts to describe society
as the totality of rational individuals are meaningless. The result does suggest, however, that such
attempts can never be completed, even in an asymptotic sense, and that we must allow for the relation
between our recognition abilities and our views of the world.
2.1 View of the World
In this paper, we treat explicitly each agent’s reasoning to chose an action by identifying individual
rationality with consistency of a view of the world. Let I = {1, 2, . . . ,m} be the index set of agents. For
each i ∈ I , denote by Ai the set of possible actions for agent i. Each action profile, (a1, a2, . . . , am) ∈∏
i∈I Ai, in the economy decides a consequence, ci, in a set, Ci, for each i ∈ I .
In standard economic arguments and non-cooperative game theory, there are stories (mathematical
structures), equilibrium and solution concepts, that enable for each agent i to have a reason for his/her
choices of an action ai. Since there are lots of reasons for (mutually exclusive) actions to be chosen,
there may also exist many equilibrium and solution concepts. The rationality (the reason) in this sense
crucially depends on the view of the world (equilibrium or solution concept). The purpose of this section
is to show that this type of rationality is completely different from our ‘true’ rationality (thinking) and
that the use (merely a part) of our true rationality may lead us to deny any such a specific view of the
world and the rationality in the restricted sense.
In the following, we suppose that agent i has a theory (written by a formal language) Li = (Li, Ri, Ti)
for obtaining a reason to decide an action ai. Li is the list of all symbols for the language, Ri is the list
of all syntactical rules including construction rules for terms, formulas, and all inference rules (making
a consequent formula from original formulas, e.g., modus ponens, instantiation, etc.), and Ti is the list
of all axiomatic formulas for the theory. We assume that each element of Li may be uniquely identified
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with (coded into) an object in a certain basic theory of sets, B = (LB , RB , TB), written under the first
order predicate logic. We call B an underlying theory of sets for Li.
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The first important assumption of this section is that such a set theory is so basic that every agent
could develop (understand) it by their own language.
(A.1) The theory Li = (Li, Ri, Ti) is at least as strong as B = (LB , RB , TB).
8 (Here, we implicitly
assume that there is an appropriate translation between the languages for Li and B. Throughout
this section, such a translation is assumed to be fixed, and we suppose that each formula ϕ in B
could be identified with “the same” formula in Li without loss of generality.)
The second assumption in this section is that though the theory, Li = (Li, Ri, Ti), of imay be stronger
than B = (LB , RB , TB), the structure of theory Li, i.e., each rules in list Ri is written in the language
of the underlying theory of sets, B. More precisely;
(A.2) B describes Li in the following sense: (i) Each member of list Li is a term (a set) in
theory B. (ii) List Ri consists of formulas in theory B. Especially, there are formulas in one free
variable, Termi(x), Formi(x), Form
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i (x), in two free variables, Neg(x, y), in three free variables,
Sbst(x, y, z), in the language of B, maintaining, respectively, that in Li, x is a term, a formula,
a formula in one free variable, a negation formula of formula y, a substitution formula of term
z into the single free variable of formula y, based on descriptions of construction rules for them
written in theory B.9 Every inference rule, as a relation among formulas of i, is also written in the
language of B as a well defined set theoretic procedure. (iii) Axiomi(x) which defines formulas of
i belonging to list Ti is written in the language of B as a well defined set theoretic procedure.
Assumption (A.2) is intended to be a sufficient condition that a combination of inference procedures,
such as a proof procedure in theory Li, may be identified with a set theoretic procedure written in the
form of a formula in theory B. It should be noted that each term, formula, and inference procedure
(including the proof procedure) of i may not be finitistic (recursive) since the set theoretic methods in
B may be much stronger than the finitistic method. Description for them, however, are given in the
language of B as set theoretical objects and processes that are well defined in set theory B.
Under (A.1) and (A.2), an agent i is possible to treat an assertion (formula) θ in the language of i
(theory Li) as a set theoretic object pθq through the underlying theory of sets, B.
10 In the following,
we call the theory, Li = (Li, Ri, Ti), satisfying these two assumptions, (A.1) and (A.2), the world view
of i. The world view may include many features of the real world by adding additional axioms and
syntactical rules, if necessary, and we suppose that an agent i chooses a ‘rational’ action ai ∈ Ai under
the world view, Li. The third assumption is on the possibility of such a structure in the world view
deciding the ‘rationality’.
7The reader may identify B with ZF , Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory under the first order predicate logic. Since such a
coding argument is usually restricted in the domain of finitistic objects, a minimal theory may be ZF− − P − INF , ZF
with the axiom of foundation, the power set, and the infinity are deleted.
8That is, every theorem in B is a theorem in Li.
9By “based on descriptions of construction rules,” I mean that the set of formulas in Li may supposively be closed
under such formation rules that are well defined in set theory B. That is, if θ is a formula in Li, then ¬θ is also a formula
in Li, if P (x) is a formula in one free variable x in Li and if t is a term in Li, then P (t) is also a formula in Li, and so
forth.
10For finitistic objects, notation p q is called Quine’s corner convention.
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(A.3) There is a formula, Pi(x), in one free variable, x, in the theory of i to mean that x = pθq
for a certain formula θ of i and θ is rationally acceptable for i. The meaning of Pi(x), as a way to
decide such acceptable sentences, is given as a set theoretic property in theory B, (hence, we may
not require it to be finitistic), so that Pi(x) may also be identified with a formula in B.
Under (A.2), one of the most typical set theoretic procedure in B satisfying conditions in (A.3) for Pi(x)
(the rational acceptability) may be the proof procedure in Li, though we do not confine ourselves to
this most familiar case. In ordinary settings in economics, such a Pi may be considered as an arbitrary
formula allowing, at least, one assertion specifying a certain character of ai ∈ Ai as a possible final
decision of an agent i, as rationally acceptable. For example, such assertions may be: “final decision
ai ∈ Ai of i is a price taking and utility maximizing behavior,” for an ordinary micro economics settings,
“final decision ai ∈ Ai of i is a best response given other agents’ behaviors,” for Nash equilibrium settings,
and so on. It follows that, an agent i ∈ I chooses an action ai ∈ Ai only if there is a sentence of i, θ,
which is rationally acceptable, (Pi(pθq)), asserting that agent i is allowed to chose action ai as his/her
final decision.
2.2 Rationality
As stated in the introduction, we are considering that an economic model should incorporate a struc-
ture which makes each agent’s behavior to be called rational. In the previous section, such a structure
is represented by the formula, Pi(x), for agent i under the world view, Li = (Li, Ri, Ti), of i. We shall
make in this section a further specification on the property Pi(x), the rationality of i.
Perhaps, the most important property for Pi to be called as the rationality of i will be the consistency.
It seems, however, that there are two kind of such consistency. One is the logical consistency and the
other is the semantical consistency. We say that Pi(x) is logically consistent if for any sentence θ of
i, Pi(pθq) and Pi(p¬θq) do not hold simultaneously. The logical consistency of Pi(x) as a fact in the
underlying theory of sets, B, is denoted by CONS(Pi). Formally;
(D.1) CONS(Pi) is a formula in B which is equivalent to saying that Formi(pθq) → (Pi(pθq) →
¬Pi(p¬θq)).11
The semantical consistency of Pi is the requirement that for any sentence θ of i, Pi(pθq) and
¬Pi(pPi(pθq)q) do not hold simultaneously. Since the condition (ordinarily) means that for each sen-
tence θ of i, Pi(pθq) → Pi(pPi(pθq)q), we also call it the introspective completeness and denote it (as a
fact in the underlying theory of sets) by COMP (Pi). Formally;
(D.2) COMP (Pi) is a formula in B which is equivalent to saying that Formi(pθq) → (Pi(pθq) →
Pi(pPi(pθq)q)).
The logical consistency and the introspective completeness of Pi will be argued in the next section
as mostly desirable properties for Pi. The reminder of this section is devoted to define additional basic
11As noted in (A.2), we assume that for each formula θ in Li, ¬θ is also a formula in Li, and that the translation
process between pθq and p¬θq may be written in a formula in B. Note also that as stated in (A.3), Pi(x) is considered
as a formula in B.
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properties for Pi. In the following, we assume that Pi automatically satisfies all of the following four
properties.12
(A.4) If B ` θ, then B ` Pi(pθq).
That is, each theorem in the underlying theory of sets is rationally acceptable for i.
(A.5) If B ` Formi(pθq) ∧ Formi(pηq) ∧ pθq = pηq, then B ` Pi(pθ ↔ ηq).
This implies that for each two formulas of i which are proved to be equal as set theoretical objects in
B, it is rationally acceptable to treat them as equivalent formulas.
(A.6) B ` Formi(pθq) → (Pi(pPi(pθq)q) → Pi(pθq)).
The rational acceptability of θ under the rational acceptability of Pi(pθq) is quite natural.
(A.7) B ` (Formi(pθq) ∧ Formi(pηq)) → (Pi(pθ → ηq) → (Pi(pθq) → Pi(pηq))).
If θ → η and θ are rationally acceptable, then η is rationally acceptable. That is, the assumption means
that rationally acceptable statements are closed under the modus ponens.
2.3 Incompleteness
In the following, the main result of this section is given in the form of three theorems. These are
different aspects of the same fact (a certain kind of incompleteness of Pi) under B with several auxiliary
assumptions. The first theorem says that with additional properties in (A.1)–(A.7), CONS(Pi) ∧
COMP (Pi) is false or is not rationally acceptable.
Theorem 2.1 : Under (A.1)–(A.7),13
B ` (CONS(Pi) ∧ COMP (Pi)) → ¬Pi(pCONS(Pi) ∧ COMP (Pi)q),
Proof : Let θ be a formula in one free variable in Li and define formula q(x) in one free variable x in
B through the set theoretic process defining formula q(pθq) as an equivarent formula of Pi(p¬θ(pθq)q).
(Under condition (A.2), we may assure that the procedure, pθq 7→ p¬θ(pθq)q, is well defined through
formulas in B. For example, we may define q(x) as “Form1(x) ∧ ∃y(∃v(Sbst(v, x, x) ∧ Neg(y, v))) ∧
Pi(y).”) Since B ` q(pqq) ↔ Pi(p¬q(pqq)q), by defining Q as q(pqq). Then,
B ` Q↔ Pi(p¬Qq).14 (1)
12The following assumptions are written in the form of theorems (or metatheorems on theorems) in B. The symbol `
denotes that the right hand side is a theorem under the development of the theory denoted by an expression at the left
hand side. Since proofs in Li (hence, in B,) may be considered as objects in the underlying theory of sets, an expression
such as “Li ` θ” may also be considered as a formula in the underlying set theory.
13More precisely, we are supposing that every facts in (A.1)–(A.7) may be treated as trivial theorems by definitions in
the underlying theory of sets, B.
14Note that by (A.1)–(A.3), q, Pi, and Q may be considered as formulas in B as well as Li though θ may not be. Since
Pi is a formula in B, it may also possible to obtain assertion (1) as an application of, so called, Go¨del’s lemma (see, e.g.,
Kunen (1980; p.40, Theorem 14.2)). I have proved it directly merely for the sake of completeness of the paper.
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Since B ` (COMP (Pi) ∧ Pi(p¬Qq)) → Pi(pPi(p¬Qq)q), by assertion (1), we have
B ` (COMP (Pi) ∧ Pi(p¬Qq)) → Pi(pQq). (2)
Therefore,
B ` (CONS(Pi) ∧ COMP (Pi)) → ¬Pi(p¬Qq). (3)
Then, by (A.4) and (A.7),
B ` Pi(pCONS(Pi) ∧ COMP (Pi)q) → Pi(p¬Pi(p¬Qq)q). (4)
By (1), we have also that B ` ¬Q↔ ¬P (p¬Qq). Then, by (A.4), (A.7) and (4),
B ` Pi(pCONS(Pi) ∧ COMP (Pi)q) → Pi(p¬Qq). (5)
Hence, by (3) and (5), we have
B ` (CONS(Pi) ∧ COMP (Pi)) → ¬Pi(pCONS(Pi) ∧ COMP (Pi)q), (6)
which was to be proved. 
The next theorem consists of assertions with one more additional property, CONS(Pi) or COMP (Pi),
to (A.1)–(A.7). The theorem shows how these two concepts are mutually introspectively inconsistent.
Theorem 2.2 : Assume that (A.1)–(A.7) hold.
(a) B ` ¬COMP (Pi) ∨ ¬CONS(Pi) ∨ ¬Pi(pCONS(Pi)q) ∨ ¬Pi(pCOMP (Pi)q).
(b) If B ` CONS(Pi), then B ` COMP (Pi) → ¬Pi(COMP (Pi)).
(c) If B ` COMP (Pi), then B ` CONS(Pi) → ¬Pi(CONS(Pi)).
(d) if B ` CONS(Pi), then B ` ¬Pi(pPi(COMP (Pi))q).
Proof : Recall equation (1) in the proof of previous theorem. Note that
B ` COMP (Pi) → (Pi(p¬Qq) → Pi(pPi(p¬Qq)q)). (7)
Hence, by (1) in the proof of previous theorem toghether with conditions (A.4) and (A.7), we have
B ` COMP (Pi) → (Pi(p¬Qq) → Pi(pQq)). (8)
It follows that
B ` COMP (Pi) → (CONS(Pi) → ¬Pi(p¬Qq)). (9)
By (A.4) and (A.7), we have
B ` Pi(pCOMP (Pi)q) → (Pi(pCONS(Pi)q) → Pi(p¬Pi(p¬Qq)q)). (10)
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Again, by (1) in the proof of previous theorem (B ` ¬Q↔ ¬Pi(p¬Qq)) to gether with (A.4) and (A.7),
it follows from (10) that
B ` Pi(pCOMP (Pi)q) → (Pi(pCONS(Pi)q) → Pi(p¬Qq)). (11)
Hence, by (9) and (11), we obtain that
B ` ¬(COMP (Pi) ∧ CONS(Pi) ∧ Pi(pCOMP (Pi)q) ∧ Pi(pCONS(Pi)q)). (12)
Hence, (a) holds. Assertion (b) and (c) follows immediately from (12) if we consider the fact that B `
CONS(Pi) and B ` CONS(Pi) mean B ` Pi(pCONS(Pi)q) and B ` Pi(pCONS(Pi)q), respectively,
under (A.4). By (b), we also have
If B ` CONS(Pi), then B ` Pi(COMP (Pi)) → ¬COMP (Pi). (13)
It follows by (A.4) and (A.7) that
If B ` CONS(Pi), then B ` Pi(pPi(COMP (Pi))q) → Pi(p¬COMP (Pi)q). (14)
Under (A.6), however, it is always true that
B ` Pi(pPi(COMP (Pi))q) → Pi(pCOMP (Pi)q). (15)
Situations in (14) and (15) show a contradiction in B (for CONS(Pi)) if Pi(pPi(COMP (Pi))q) is true.
We have, therefore, the last assertion (d). 
The last theorem is on the inconsistency of all properties (A.1)–(A.7), CONS(Pi), and COMP (Pi),
together with the underlying theory of sets, B. It may also possible to understand the theorem as an
undefinability theorem of the concept “rationality”.
Theorem 2.3 : Under (A.1)–(A.7), it is impossible for theory B to prove CONS(Pi) and COMP (Pi),
simultaneously.
Proof : If B proves CONS(Pi)∧COMP (Pi), it also proves Pi(pCONS(Pi) ∧ COMP (Pi)q) under
(A.4), which contradicts to Theorem 2.1. 
Remark 2.1 : (Undefinability of Rationality) If we change (A.3) so that it states the property
of Pi in (A.3) without maintaining the existence of Pi, the above theorem asserts that there is no
set theoretically well defined procedure in B (under (A.1) and (A.2)) for defining Pi, a concept of the
rationality, satisfying (A.4)–(A.7), CONS(Pi) and COMP (Pi), i.e., we obtain an undefinability theorem
of rationality.
Remark 2.2 : (Tarski’s Truth Definition Theorem) The special case that B = Li = ZF and
Pi is considered as a definition of “truth” (which clearly satisfy properties (A.4)–(A.7), CONS(Pi) and
COMP (Pi)) is Tarski’s truth definition theorem (see, Kunen (1980), p.41).
Remark 2.3 : (Undefinability of Common Knowledge) Especially, if there are two agents, i and
j, having the same rationality in the set theory, (pPiq = pPjq), then (D.2) is a necessary condition for
their rationality to be a common knowledge, i.e., Pj(pθq) → Pi(pPj(pθq)q) and Pi(θ) → Pj(pPi(pθq)q).
Hence, the above result may also be interpreted as an undefinability theorem of rationality as a consistent
common knowledge.
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3 SOCIETY AND VALUES
In this section, we continue to analyze formal set theoretical limitations in describing the human
society. Results in the previous section was that there is no satisfactory way to formalize the human
society as long as we identify it with the whole of ‘rational’ individuals (the methodological individualism).
The purpose of this section is to show that the problem may not vanish even when we look for a structure
which may not necessarily have such a micro foundation.
A description of the society that has no micro foundations needs other types of verifications for the
validity of the description itself. Indeed, it is a fundamental feature of the logical positivism to consider
the world (the society) as the whole of logical sentences that may or may not hold, and the purpose
of social science, (if it may be called as a science,) is to find assertions that are true (or at least may
be called as adequate) for a description of the society. If we require such verifications for the validity,
however, there always exists the problem on the introspective (semantical) and logical consistency as is
the case with structures for rational individuals. That is, such a social validity cannot be introspectively
(semantically) consistent as long as we require it to be logically consistent.
Let us denote here by P (x) the assertion in a certain formal language, L, meaning that “the society
is such that the assertion x holds.” Suppose that the language, L, may be treated as a list of objects
in a certain theory of sets, B, which is also written by formulas in language L. We consider that B is
a set theory under the first order predicate logic. (For the sake of simplicity, one may identify B with
ZF , Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, under the first order predicate logic.)15 Hence, we may deal with each
formula, θ, in L as a set theoretical object, pθq, in B. Moreover, assume that the formula, P (x), in one
free variable, x, is a set theoretically well defined property (i.e., we may also identify P (x) as a formula
in B,) or (if B is a sufficiently strong theory) an structural object in B. Then, under several natural
conditions, we have the following results:
(1) There exists a mathematical truth ( B ` θ ) that isn’t socially valid ( B ` ¬P (pθq)). (Theorem
3.1.)
(2) Especially, we cannot verify the semantical (introspective) consistency of the description, P (x),
itself. (Theorem 3.2.)
(3) We cannot define (formally describe) the society as long as we require it to be logically and
semantically consistent. (Theorem 3.3.)
These arguments may also be restated as follows: if we identify the description of the society with
deciding what is valid in the society, then the social validity (a value judgement in the society) is
always restrictive in the sense that we are not allowed to ask what the society exactly is (as long as we
require it to be logically and semantically consistent). Of course, the result may also be interpreted as
a general statement on various social values, i.e., we cannot completely describe social norms, justice,
15This is the same setting as in the preceding section, except that L and B are not private but public language and
theory, respectively. As in the previous section, for mathematical concepts, see Kunen (1980), Jech (2003), and Fraenkel
et al. (1973). I am convinced in that the linguistic definitions and approaches throughout this paper are so common
in standard arguments in philosophical analysis that it is not appropriate to refer to merely a few of such authors. On
the standpoint of our notions of rationality and truth, however, I have obtained much from recent works in analytical
philosophy and cognitive science, such as Kripke (1972), Putnam (1983), and Lakoff (1987).
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and/or validities as well defined structures (mechanisms) as long as we require it to be logically and
semantically consistent.
These results are closely related to the arguments in the previous section in which it is the logically
consistent rationality of individuals that makes description of the society introspectively inconsistent.
In this section, it is the logically consistent values in the society that makes verification of the society
introspectively inconsistent. It can be said that though the truth and/or rationality in our society are
determined by ourselves, no single mind is allowed to control or even define them.
3.1 Society
As in Section 2, we assume that all mathematical arguments and theorems are supposed to be given
in a certain formal set theory, B = (LB , RB , TB), where LB is the list of symbols, RB is the list of
syntactical rules, and TB is the list of axioms. Moreover, it is also assumed that in describing the society,
a language, L = (L,R, T ), is used, where L (the list of symbols), R (the list of syntactical rules), and T
(the list of axioms) are sufficient for developing the theory B under the first order predicate logic in the
sense that every formula in B may be identified with a formula in L. That is, we assume the following:
(B.1) B may be identified with a set theory under the first order predicate logic. Every symbol-
s, terms, formulas, inference rules, and logical (non-mathematical) axioms in B are written by
formulas in L.
Moreover, we assume that L is formalized under B. Precisely:
(B.2) B describes L in the following sense: (i) Each member of list L is a set in theory B. (ii) List
Ri consists of formulas in theory B. Especially, there are formulas in one free variable, Term(x),
Form(x), Form1(x), Neg(x, y) and Sbst(x, y, z) describing, respectively, “x is a terms of L,”
“x is a formula of L,” “x is a formula in one free variable,” “x is a negation of y,” and “y is
a formula in one free variable, and x is the formula obtained by substituting a term z into y.”
Every inference rule, as a relation among formulas in L, is also written in the language of B. (iii)
Axiom(x) which defines formulas of L belonging to list T is also a formula in B.
Assumption (B.2) enables us to treat each assertion θ in L as a set theoretical object pθq in theory
B. Since every terms and formulas in B is also in L by (B.1), through theory B, language L may be
formalized in L itself.
In this section, we assume that the concept of the society is given in a logical formula, P (pθq), in one
free variable pθq, in B, maintaining that “the assertion θ in L is valid as a description for the society.”
That is, we identify the problem, “what is the society” with the problem “which assertion holds in
the society.” Hence, if there is a complete description of the society, we may obtain all the relevant
assertions on what the society is, what we are in the society, and what we should do in the society. We
suppose that such a structure of the society, i.e., the meanings of P , is given in the underlying theory
of sets, B. Formally:
(B.3) There is a formula, P (x), in one free variable x in the theory of sets, B, asserting that
“x = pθq for a certain assertion θ in L which is valid for a description of the society.”
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Of course, by (B.1), every formula in B is also in L, so that the formula P (x) is in L as well as in B.16
The “validity” stated in the above will be discussed axiomatically in the next section. Assumption (B.3)
at least maintains, however, the standpoint that we identify the world with the whole of valid logical
formulas whatever the meaning of the validity is.17 Hence, in this sense, we identify the society with
the whole of values in the society.
3.2 Social Validity and Mathematical Truth
As stated in the previous section, we are considering in assumption (B.3) that to define the society
is nothing but to decide what the valid descriptions for the society are, hence, is nothing but to decide
what the validity in the society is. That is, we are considering that all values in the society are closely
related to the description of the society itself.18 Hence, the problem on P we have seen in the following
of this section is nothing but a problem on the (formally and mechanically defined) values in the society.
As a mechanism which defines the validity in the society, it will be natural for us to expect P having
the following properties.19
(C.1) (Logical Consistency: CONS) P (pθq) → ¬P (p¬θq).
(C.2) (Semantical Consistency: COMP) P (pθq) → P (pP (pθq)q)
(C.3) There is at least one formula ϕ such that B ` ϕ and B ` P (pϕq).
(C.4) If B ` ϕ→ ψ, then B ` P (pϕq) → P (pψq).
In the following, we see that if we use (C.1) (C.2) and (C.4) as defined properties of P , (i.e., (C.1)
(C.2) and (C.4) are automatically proved in B by definition), then we have a certain mathematical
truth that cannot be a socially valid statement.
Theorem 3.1 : Under (B.1) (B.2) (B.3) (C.1) (C.2) and (C.4), there is a statement, ψ, that is
mathematically true ( B ` ψ ) though it is not socially valid ( B ` ¬P (pψq) ).
Proof : Let θ be a formula in one free variable of L and define formula q in one free variable in
B through the process identifying q(pθq) with an equivalent formula of P (p¬θ(pθq)q) as in the proof of
Theorem 2.1 (assertion (1)), and Q be the formula q(pqq). Then, as before, we have
B ` Q↔ P (p¬Qq), (16)
B ` ¬Q↔ ¬P (p¬Qq). (17)
16Indeed, as in the preceding section, such a formula is more appropriate to be regarded as a formula in L than B even
if it is written in B. It is the “meaning” of P that is given in the theory B, so that the formula P itself is more natural
to be considered as a formula in L.
17Or, at least, we are considering that a complete description of the society should decide (in the sense of B) a set of
logical formulas that are valid view of the society.
18The results in this section, however, holds even if there is no relation between such a validity and a description of
the society. In such a case, the results may be considered as criticism for such a concept of “validity,” i.e., for the logical
positivism.
19Note that the following assumptions are written in the form of formulas in B ((C.1),(C.2)) or assertions on theorems
in B ((C.3),(C.4)). The symbol, `, (as in (C.3), (C.4), etc.), denotes that the right hand side is a theorem under the
development of the theory denoted by an expression (as theory B with or without some additional axioms) at the left
hand side.
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Since, by (C.2), B ` P (p¬Qq) → P (pP (p¬Qq)q), we have by (16) together with (C.4),
B ` P (p¬Qq) → P (pQq). (18)
Therefore, by (C.1),
B ` ¬P (p¬Qq). (19)
By (17) together with (C.4), however, statement (19) also implies
B ` ¬P (p¬P (p¬Qq)q). (20)
Let ψ be the formula, ¬P (p¬Qq). Then, by (19) and (20), ψ satisfies the condition of the theorem. 
The mathematical truth which cannot be socially valid in the above theorem, may not have any serious
meanings in view of social science. There seems to exist, however, an important kind of such assertions
with respect to the structure of P itself. Denote condition (C.1) and condition (C.2) by CONS and
COMP respectively. If we assume (C.3) and (C.4) together with (B.1), (B.2), and (B.3), we can see
that CONS and COMP , themselves, may be classified into such an important kind of sentences, as
the next theorem asserts.
Theorem 3.2 : Assume (B.1), (B.2), (B.3), (C.3), and (C.4).
(a) B ` ¬COMP ∨ ¬CONS ∨ ¬P (pCOMPq) ∨ ¬P (pCONSq).
(b) If B ` COMP , we have B ` CONS → ¬P (pCONSq).
(c) If B ` CONS, we have B ` COMP → ¬P (pCOMPq).
Proof : Let Q be the same formula defined in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Note that (16) and (17)
are also true under the setting of Theorem 3.2. Since B ` (COMP ∧ P (p¬Qq)) → P (pP (p¬Qq)q), by
equation (16) together with (C.4), we have
B ` COMP → (P (p¬Qq) → P (pQq)). (21)
Therefore,
B ` COMP → (CONS → ¬P (p¬Qq)). (22)
Then, by (C.4),
B ` P (pCOMPq) → (P (pCONSq) → P (p¬P (p¬Qq)q)). (23)
Hence, by (17) and (C.4),
B ` P (pCOMPq) → (P (pCONSq) → P (p¬Qq)). (24)
Under (22) and (24), if COMP ∧CONS ∧P (pCOMPq)∧P (pCONSq) is true, a contradiction follows
(in theory B), so that we have (a). Under (C.3) and (C.4), by considering ϕ in (C.4) as the formula
whose existence is assured in (C.3), we have for any formula ψ in B, if B ` ψ, then B ` P (ψ). Therefore,
B ` COMP implies B ` P (pCOMPq) and B ` CONS implies P (pCONSq), so that assertions (b)
and (c) immediately follow form (a). 
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Lastly, we see the inconsistency of all properties (B.1)–(B.3) and (C.1)–(C.4) together with the un-
derlying theory of sets, B. It may also possible to understand the theorem as an undefinability theorem
of the concept “social validity”.
Theorem 3.3 : Under (B.1),(B.2),(B.3),(C.3) and (C.4), it is impossible for theory B to prove CONS
and COMP , simultaneously.
Proof : Assume that B proves COMP and CONS. Then, by (C.3) and (C.4), B also proves
P (pCOMPq) and P (pCONSq), which contradicts to (a) in the previous theorem. 
Remark 3.1 : (Undefinability of Social Validity) If we change (B.3) so that it asserts merely
the property of P without maintaining the existence, the above theorem maintains that there is no
set theoretical possibility (in B under (B.1) and (B.2)) for defining a concept of the social validity, P ,
satisfying (C.1)–(C.4).
4 RATIONALITY AS A FIXED POINT FOR VIEWS OF THE WORLD
In this section, by incorporating the arguments in Sections 2 and 3 of the previous chapter, rationality
and social validity are figured out as an equilibrium of social model in which cognitive features of
members are treated explicitly. Intuitively, the model in this section describes the situation in which
each member is possible to chose an arbitrary finite number of models of the society, the possible worlds,
to approximate the ‘real’ world. Even though candidates for such models of the society for each member
may not be finite and members are not convinced in his/her approximation to be complete, we can
expect the existence of the list of each person’s view of the world and ‘rational’ behaviors based on
them, which are also compatible with each person’s view of the world in the light of their experiences
and beliefs for the validity of the model, as long as the total space for behaviors is not so large, e.g., a
compact Hausdorff space.
Results in the previous two sections tell us how it is difficult to describe ‘individual rationality’ and/or
‘social validity’ as artifical objects (i.e., conditions for them are determined conventionally by ourselves).
In this section, by considering the space of action configurations of all members, X =
∏
i∈I Xi, as the set
of rigid designators that are identified across possible worlds, we characterize a list of rational behaviors
(“justified” under a view of the world) and a possible world (“compatible” with such behaviors) as an
equilibrium situation for recognition of the society.
By arguments in Section 2, such a “justification” procedure for rational actions (under a view of the
world like an economic model) may be consistent though it may not be so complete to justify what is
the “possibility” for views of the world. Judgements for the “compatibility” (to determine what are
appropriate to be called as possible worlds), therefore, should be another social validity based on the
same view of the world recognizing it as valid. Section 3 tells, however, that we cannot expect such a
“validity” to be so strong as maintaining the validity of itself as long as we require it to be consistent. It
follows that any attempt to determine “possibility of the world” rigorously through sets of necessary and
sufficient conditions seems to be incorrect. We have to leave the extension of such a concept somewhat
open to the situation of self reliance of our minds, say, to our willingness, to seek another possibility of
the world.
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To describe and assure the existence of equilibria, we use a certain kind of mixed strategy (together
with expected utility) settings for the sake of simplicity and familiarity of arguments. A view of the
world in this paper, therefore, is taken as a mixture of possible worlds (e.g., a probability measure on
several possible worlds), and the justification for behaviors and the judgement for compatibility, firstly
associated merely with each possible world, are supposed to be extended on over all such mixtures,
views of the world.20 The essential feature of this section’s approach, however, does not depend on
such a special framework. The central ideas discussed here is to characterize human’s “rationality,” at
least in the sense of “rational behaviors” for game theoretic settings in social science, and “validity” for
a society, not as terms or objects fixed by a set of criteria laid down in advance, but as references to
determine the extensions of the terms that refer to them by using classes of laws the whole of which we
do not exactly know.21
4.1 Individual and Society
Let I = {1, 2, . . . ,m} be the index set of members of society. For each i ∈ I , denote by Xi the
set of possible behaviors for individual i. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that each Xi is a
non-empty compact convex subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space. We also assume that Xi
covers all the behaviors that are observable to others for each i ∈ I and that each behavior profile
(x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈
∏
i∈I Xi is sufficient to decide a consequence, ci ∈ Ci for each i ∈ I .
4.2 Languages and Possible Worlds
Each member, i, is assumed to have a set of logical formulas, Ti, inference rules, Ri, and a language,
Li, that may be considered as the list of symbols describing the formulas. Triplet (Li, Ri, Ti) is called
a possible world of i. Member i may have a lot of (we suppose possibly denumerably many) possible
worlds, W 0i = (L
0
i , R
0
i , T
0
i ), W
1
i = (L
1
i , R
1
i , T
1
i ), W
2
i = (L
2
i , R
2
i , T
2
i ), . . .. We assume they may not
mutually be consistent nor may not even be translatable one another.
Let us consider the inductive limit of abstract simplices, Wi = lim−→n
W 0i · · ·W
n
i , where eachW
0
i · · ·W
n
i
is identified with n-dimensional standard unit simplex ∆n. A point, w ∈ Wi, may be considered as
representing a special standpoint of i’s thought. We call it as i’s view of the world.
Each i cannot use Wi as a formal object of his/her theory to understand the world. We do not except,
however, the case that Wmi is treated in a certain W
n
i as a formal object.
4.3 Possible Worlds and Behaviors
For each i ∈ I , possible worlds of i, W 0i ,W
1
i ,W
2
i , . . ., represent various kinds of reasoning for a certain
behavior, xi ∈ Xi to be considered better than other others. For example, W ni may be a possible world
20One may ask why such a view of the world (in the above sense of the mixture) itself is not classified into one of the
possible worlds. Of course, we may call it as a possible world as long as it is prepared as a candidate for his/her possible
worlds from the beginning.
21The idea may be restated that those terms are treated asnatural kind words in the sense of Kripke (1972) and Putnam
(see, e.g., Putnam (1983), 4.Reference and Truth). Their approaches (independently proceeded in 1960’s and 1970’s) are
called the new theory of refenrence; and at least in this section, the concept of “possible world” is used in relation to this
context.
14
of a Nash Equilibrium, i.e., under W ni , i is convinced in that his/her choice of behavior xi is reasonable
since it is a part of a Nash equilibrium strategy profile for a certain game theoretic model of society
which is completely described and treated as valid in (Lni , R
n
i , T
n
i ). (In such cases, i’s estimation on
thoughts of other persons are also described completely and treated as valid under axioms for individuals
in (Lni , R
n
i , T
n
i ). ) It is also possible to consider W
n
i as a world of cooperation equilibrium, (i.e., i
thinks that his/her behavior may be considered as a reasonable action since everyone’s behavior may
be classified as choices to decide a consequence in a core of the game defined in W ni ), a world of an
incomplete information game, a world of an abstract economy (in which the constraint correspondence
is described as a rule in T ni ), and so on. (It should be remarked that we are assuming that all behaviors
which is possible for i is completely listed in Xi. Hence, each Xi is so defined as to include a mixed
strategy if such behaviors are allowed to exist in the formalized model.)
4.4 Justification and Refutability
Each possible world W ni of i ∈ I defines for a given profile of behaviors, x = (xj)j∈I ∈
∏
j∈I Xj ,
the set of justified behaviors, Φi(W
n
j , x) ⊂ Xi, as behaviors that are better than xi under W
n
i , and the
set of incompatible profiles of behaviors, ΘXi (W
n
i ) ⊂
∏
j∈I Xj , under W
n
i . When (an observable fact)
x is incompatible with W ni , we say that W
n
i is refutable for i under x. In the following, we shall treat
rationality of i based on a justification for behavior xi of profile x = (xj)j∈I ∈
∏
j∈I Xj under a certain
possible world that is not refutable under x. (Note that i may treat sets Φi(W
n
i , x) and Θ
X
i (W
n
i ) in
his/her formal theory, W ni , though he/she may not recognize them as relations on or into Wi.)
As stated before, we consider that i’s view of the world is a point, wi ∈Wi = lim−→n
W 0i · · ·W
n
i . Person
i has no formalized theory on the rightness among possible worlds in Wi. (This is not saying that we
prevent i from having formal treatments among finitely many possible worlds, W 0i , . . . ,W
n
i , in a certain
Wmi .) Hence, we may interpret a point, wi ∈ W
0
i · · ·W
n
i ⊂ Wi, as a representation of the state of
i’s thought in the form of a degree of confidence among possible worlds, W 0i · · ·W
n
i . In this sense, we
suppose that Φi and Θ
X
i may adequately be extended as correspondences on Wi. Of course, a certain
wi = (w
0
i , . . . , w
`(i)
i ) ∈ Wi, may justify or refute behaviors in various ways based on W
0
i , . . . ,W
`(i)
i . We
may assume, however, that it would be natural for Φi and Θ
X
i to satisfy following conditions.
(A.1) x ∈ Φi(vi, z) and y ∈ Φi(wi, z) implies that for all λ ∈ [0, 1], there exists λˆ ∈ [0, 1], such that
λx+ (1− λ)y ∈ Φi(λˆvi + (1− λˆ)wi, z).
(A.2) x /∈ ΘXi (vi) and x /∈ Θ
X
i (wi) implies that for all λ ∈ [0, 1], x /∈ Θ
X
i (λvi + (1− λ)wi).
Two conditions would be quite natural. Condition (A.1) says that a mixture of better strategies will
be supported by a certain mixture of the two possible worlds. It should be noted here that λˆ may be
different from λ. Condition (A.2) asserts that if x does not refute two possible worlds, then it does not
refute standpoints of their mixture.
By considering the fact that there is no complete description of the world (results in earlier sections),
it would be appropriate to treat such a standpoint, a view of the world, as a candidate for, say, a wide
sense of rationality. The next section is devoted to show the existence of such rationality as a fixed
point of social recognition.
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4.5 Equilibrium under Social Recognition
We are assuming that there are possible worlds, W 0i ,W
1
i ,W
2
i , . . . , for each i ∈ I , which means that
person i does not have any formalized ideas on the relation among ‘all’ of such possible worlds. In other
words, W 0i ,W
1
i ,W
2
i , . . ., are all of the formalized ideas of i with respect to the society. At the same
time, we have supposed that for each i ∈ I , there are relations Φi and ΘXi on Wi = lim−→n
W 0i · · ·W
n
i and
X into Wi, based on justifications and refutabilities defined in each of W
n
i ’s. As stated before, they are
not written in the theories of i.
Let X =
∏
i∈I Xi and W =
∏
i∈I Wi. Given behavior profile x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ X =
∏
i∈I Xi and
view of the world wi ∈ Wi of i, we denote by ϕi(wi, x) ⊂ W × X , the set of pairs, (vi, yi) such that
x /∈ ΘXi (vi) and yi ∈ Φi(vi, x), i.e., the set of pairs of non refutable view vi of the world under x and
justified behavior yi as better than xi under vi. Pair (w, x) = (w1, . . . , wm, x1, . . . , xm) ∈W ×X is said
to be an equilibrium (under social recognition) for society ((Wi, Xi,Φi,Θ
X
i )i∈I) if ϕi(wi, x) = ∅ for all
i ∈ I . Adding to it, if x /∈ ΘXi (Wi) for all i ∈ I , the equilibrium, (w, x), is called rational.
Theorem 4.1 : Society ((Wi, Xi,Φi,Θ
X
i )i∈I ) has an equilibrium if (A.1), (A.2), and the following
condition for each Φi is satisfied .
(A.3) For each (vi, yi) ∈ Wi ×Xi, Φ
−1
i (vi, yi) ⊂W ×X is open.
The equilibrium is rational if for each i ∈ I and x ∈ X, there is at least one wi ∈ Wi such that
x /∈ ΘXi (wi).
Proof : Assume the contrary. Then, for each (w, x) = (w1, . . . , wm, x1, . . . , xm) ∈ W × X , there
exists at least one i ∈ I such that ϕi(wi, x) 6= ∅, i.e., there are i ∈ I and a pair, (vxi , y
x
i ) ∈ Wi × Xi,
such that x /∈ ΘXi (v
x
i ) and y
x
i ∈ Φi(v
x
i , x). Under (A.3), there is an open neighborhood, V (w) × U(x),
of (w, x) such that (vxi , y
x
i ) ∈ Φi(vi, z) for all (v, z) ∈ V (w)×U(x). Note that the definition of ϕi enable
us to chose V (w) as v(w) = W for all w. Then, since X is compact, we may assume that there are
finite points, x1, . . . , xn ∈ X , and their open neighborhoods, U(x1), . . . , U(xn), with indices of persons,
i(1), . . . , i(n) ∈ I , and their thoughts and behaviors, (vi(1), yi(1)) ∈ Wi(1) × Xi(1), . . . , (vi(n), yi(n)) ∈
Wi(n) × Xi(n), satisfying for each t = 1, . . . , n, that (vi(t), yi(t)) ∈ Φi(vi, z) for all z ∈ U(x
t). Let
α1 : X → [0, 1], . . . , αn : X → [0, 1], be the partition of unity subordinated to U(x1), . . . , U(xn). Denote
byN(i) ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n} the subset of indices for neighborhoods associated with i, i.e., N(i) = {t | i(t) = i}
for each i ∈ I . Moreover, denote by Ui the set
⋃
t∈N(i) U(x
t). Of course, {Ui|i ∈ I} covers X . On
each Ui ⊂ X , i ∈ I , define mapping ψi : Ui → Xi as ψi(x) =
∑
t∈N(i) αtyi(t) and correspondence
Ψi : Ui → X as Ψi(x) = {ψi(x)}×
∏
j∈I,j 6=i Xj . Under (A.1) and (A.2), Ψi is non-empty convex valued
correspondence satisfying xi /∈ Ψi(x) for each x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Ui. It also has the open lower section
property under (A.3). Define correspondence Ψ : X → X as
Ψ(x) =
⋂
i∈{j∈I|x∈Uj}
Ψi(x).
Then, Ψ is a non-empty convex valued correspondence having no fixed point, which is impossible since
X is non-empty compact convex set. (Non-empty valued convex correspondence into itself having lower
intersection property has a fixed point.) Hence, there is an equilibrium point x∗ ∈ X . The last assertion
is clear since the fact ϕ(wi, x
∗) = ∅ for all i does not depend on w = (w1, . . . , wm). 
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